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ALD-088

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3887
___________
ROBERT R. VERBANIK,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDANT MICHAEL HARLOW; C/O MICHEL SCHULLER;
C/O JASON ANDREWS; C/O WALTER YOUREMA; C/O SGT. THOMAS MILLS;
C/O SGT. ERIC YOHE; C/O CAPTAIN CONRAD DECHANT; C/O A GORDON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00448)
District Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 17, 2013
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Robert Verbanik, proceeding pro se, appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s order granting Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and denying Verbanik’s motion for summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order pursuant to Third
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Verbanik, previously incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Mercer,
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Mercer”), filed a complaint in April 2009, alleging numerous claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and in response Verbanik
filed an amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint and
Verbanik filed a second amended complaint. In his second amended complaint Verbanik
raised a series of claims against correctional officers and their supervisors employed at
SCI-Mercer. The majority of Verbanik’s claims relate to grievances brought against SCIMercer staff pursuant to the Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, Policy
Statement DC-ADM 804 and to misconduct charges brought against Verbanik pursuant
to Inmate Disciplinary and Restricted Housing Procedures, Policy Statement DC-ADM
801. Verbanik raised seventeen claims that can generally be categorized as claims of
retaliation, due process violations, verbal harassment, equal protection violations,
conspiracy, and supervisory liability. Verbanik also raised state law claims.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Verbanik’s second amended complaint. The
District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, determining that Verbanik failed to
exhaust administrative remedies for many of his claims and failed to state a claim for the
remainder. Verbanik appealed and this Court remanded the matter to the District Court
for further proceedings because it was questionable whether Defendants’ conduct
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rendered administrative remedies unavailable and because the District Court erred in
considering matters outside the pleadings without advising the parties and allowing
Verbanik an opportunity to file an affidavit in response.
On remand, Verbanik filed a motion “In Support of Third Circuits
Remand/Vacation” that the District Court construed as a motion for summary judgment.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a response in opposition to
Verbanik’s motion for summary judgment. Verbanik also filed a response in opposition
to Defendants’ motion. The District Court denied Verbanik’s motion for summary
judgment and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The District Court
declined to grant summary judgment to Defendants based on Verbanik’s alleged failure
to administratively exhaust his claims and instead granted summary judgment based on
the claims’ lack of merit. Verbanik appealed the District Court’s decision and filed a
motion requesting appointment of counsel.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. McGreevy v.
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court reviewing a summary judgment motion
must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72
3

F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). However, a party opposing summary judgment “must
present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions’ to show the
existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir.
2005).
III.
A prisoner litigating a retaliation claim must show that the conduct provoking the
alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some “adverse action”
at the hands of the prison officials “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and that the constitutionally protected conduct was
a substantial motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330,
333 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation the burden shifts to the defendant
“to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action
complained of.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006).
Verbanik alleged four specific instances of retaliation: (1) he was housed in Ablock of SCI-Mercer for four months because Defendants believed he was racist, (2) he
was transferred to a less desirous cell for filing a grievance against a defendant, (3) he
was locked in a shower for up to two hours for filing a different grievance against a
defendant, and (4) Defendants fabricated and issued misconduct charges against
Verbanik in retaliation for his use of the grievance process.

4

The District Court determined, and our review of the record confirms, that as to
the first two retaliation claims Verbanik failed to state a retaliation claim as a matter of
law because he did not demonstrate that the living conditions he endured constituted an
adverse action. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).
Regarding Verbanik’s third retaliation claim, the District Court concluded that he
failed to establish the existence of an adverse action because he “has not even alleged that
he was cold or that the conditions were such that they could be described as unenjoyable
to an ordinary inmate in a similar situation.” Verbanik filed a grievance days before the
shower incident and when he asked two of the defendants if his time in the shower was
punishment enough, one of them replied “write the warden up again and see what
happens to you.” These events may be enough to establish causality between
Defendants’ conduct and Verbanik’s utilization of his grievance rights, see Lauren W. ex
rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007), but being left in the shower
on one occasion for at most 105 minutes over the required 15 minutes shower-time does
not, without more, 1 constitute an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising their constitutional rights. See Allah, 229 F.3d at 225
(“[W]hether a prisoner-plaintiff has met [the adverse action] prong of his or her
retaliation claim will depend on the facts of the particular case.”); cf. Gill v. Pidlypchak,

1

Although Verbanik responds to the District Court in his Argument in Support of
Appeal, noting that he “was left in a closet sized room with only boxer shorts on, so of
course it was cold,” issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. See
Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).
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389 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2004) (sentencing prisoner to three weeks in keeplock
constituted adverse action). Consequently, in Verbanik’s third retaliation claim he failed
to state a prima facie claim because he did not allege an adverse action.
Finally, regarding the fourth retaliation claim, that Defendants issued false
misconduct charges against Verbanik, we agree with the District Court that insofar as
Verbanik stated a prima facie case of retaliation, Defendants have proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct charges would have been filed even if
Verbanik had not engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that the misconduct
charges were reasonably related to penological interests. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.
Verbanik’s second set of claims alleged due process violations centered on the
claimed falsified misconduct charges, the misconduct proceedings, and the punishments
he received as a result of the misconduct charges, 60 and 105 days of disciplinary time
for separate misconduct charges. We agree with the District Court that Verbanik has not
demonstrated that his punishment amounted to an “atypical and significant hardship . . .
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995); see Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 652-54 (3d Cir. 2003). As a result, this
due process claim fails.
Verbanik’s third set of claims alleged that Defendants verbally harassed him in
retaliation for his filing of grievances. We agree with the District Court’s analysis and
conclusion that Verbanik’s allegations of verbal harassment do no state a cognizable
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claim under § 1983. See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001);
Dewalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000).
Verbanik’s fourth set of claims alleged that Defendants violated his equal
protection rights by selectively punishing him for violation of prison regulations. In
order to establish an equal protection claim a prisoner must demonstrate that he was
purposefully discriminated against and was treated differently than other individuals
similarly situated. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990).
Further, to establish an equal protection claim based on selective enforcement the
plaintiff must show that the was treated differently based on an “unjustifiable standard,
such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor, . . . or to prevent the exercise of a
fundamental right.” Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Verbanik claimed that on two occasions he was unfairly targeted for
violation of prison regulations while other prisoners in violation of the same regulations
were not disciplined. Verbanik’s bare allegation of selective enforcement is not enough
to state a claim; prison officials are accorded deference in their management of prison
policies and practices in order to maintain prison security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
546-47 (1979). Aside from the fact that other prisoners were not disciplined when
Verbanik was, he did not indicate that he was purposefully discriminated against. As the
District Court noted, Verbanik’s invocation of the concept of equal protection alone fails
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to show that he was purposefully discriminated against and treated differently based on
an unjustifiable standard and his claim fails.
Verbanik’s fifth set of claims concern allegations that Defendants conspired to
have a fellow inmate attack Verbanik. Verbanik acknowledges that he was never
attacked. Consequently, we agree with the District Court that even if Defendants had
conspired to injure Verbanik, absent an overt act that actually did injure him he has failed
to state a claim. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182 (1913).
Verbanik’s sixth set of claims alleged supervisory liability for the previouslydescribed purported wrongdoing. However, we agree with the District Court that because
Verbanik’s claims upon which the supervisory liability was necessarily based were
inadequate, his claim of supervisory liability fails. See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011).
Finally, we agree that the District Court appropriately decided not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Verbanik’s state law claims and dismissed them without
prejudice because all of the claims over which it had original jurisdiction were dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir.
1995).
IV.
The District Court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
and denied Verbanik’s motion for summary judgment. We will summarily affirm the
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order of the District Court because no substantial question is presented by this appeal. 3d
Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We deny Verbanik’s motion for appointment of counsel.
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